Worthwhile Canadian Initiative

Interest rate targeting as a social construction

We always knew that interest rate targeting could never work in theory, because it left the price level indeterminate. But it seemed to work well in practice, and kept inflation close to target, so we eventually learned to overcome our theoretical squeamishness and embrace it as part of the reality of how modern central banks operate. But now interest rate targeting has failed in practice, and failed badly. It cannot keep inflation, and expected inflation, on target. We want to loosen monetary policy. And because monetary policy is interest rate targeting, we can't, because interest rates on safe liquid assets are already at zero.

Why current AD depends on expected future AD: Scott Sumner in ISLM

Scott Sumner argues that nominal interest rates are near zero because monetary policy (specifically expected future monetary policy) is too tight. He argues that tight (expected future) monetary policy makes expected inflation low, which makes nominal rates low. He also argues that tight (expected future) monetary policy makes real rates low as well.  I want to re-state Scott Sumner's argument in terms of a standard ISLM model. I know Scott doesn't like the ISLM model, but I do. And more economists understand the standard ISLM model than perhaps understand Scott's verbal reasoning.

Towards a Monetarist theory of Neo-Chartalism

I am going to start with an orthodox monetarist approach, make one trivial semantic change, and see how far I can get in deriving Neo-Chartalist results. The semantic change is to change what I mean by "fiscal policy". It's an unconventional definition of fiscal policy, from a monetarist perspective, but I don't think a monetarist could otherwise object.

Churches and Central Banks

If a social scientist wanted to understand what happens in church, he could ask the churchgoers themselves for an account of what they do in church. But the social scientist's account of what happens in church need not be the same as the churchgoers' account.

If an economist wanted to understand what happens in a central bank, he could ask the central bankers themselves for an account of what they do in the central bank. But the economist's account of what happens in central banks need not be the same as the central bankers' account.

Why do central banks have assets?

If you look at the balance sheet of a central bank, you will see it has liabilities (mostly currency) and assets (normally mostly government bonds/bills). Why do central banks have assets? Do they need them?

The wrong answer is that central banks need assets to "back" the value of the currency, and that paper currency would be worthless otherwise. The right answer is: since the government gets all the profits from a central bank anyway, there's no point in giving the government the assets; that owning assets lets the bank reverse course and reduce the money supply if it ever needs to; and it stops the accountants freaking out.

What makes a bank a central bank? Asymmetric redeemability and the will to act as one.

Both central banks and commercial banks issue liabilities that function as media of exchange. Why do we say that it is central banks, rather than commercial banks, that determine monetary policy; setting interest rates in the short run, and inflation in the long run? What makes a bank a central bank?

The Globe's Konrad Yakabuski succumbs to the monetary union zombie

And so it continues. I noted on Wednesday that the Globe and Mail's lead editorial on exchange rate policy demonstrated a singular lack of understanding of the economics of exchange rate policy. A particularly astute commenter noted that it was only a question of time before the zombie notion of monetary union started lumbering across the political landscape in search of brains, and it would appear that the Globe's Konrad Yakabuski has succumbed, in the form of a long essay in the Saturday edition.

I don't have a shotgun, so I'll just fisk it:

Why can't the Fed just buy yuan?

The title really says it all. And it's not a rhetorical question; I don't know the answer. But if the US is really concerned (H/T Mark Thoma) about the US dollar being too high against China's yuan, and it believes China is "artificially" preventing the yuan from appreciating against the dollar by foreign exchange market intervention, why can't the Fed just intervene in the opposite direction, by buying yuan?

Cheap talk and the exchange rate

Why does the Loonie appreciate when the Bank of Canada tightens monetary policy (relative to what was expected)? And depreciate when the Bank loosens monetary policy (relative to what was expected)?

Before you conclude I've lost it, by asking such an easy question, consider the following weird thought-experiment.

Oil prices in currencies other than the USD

I've received a request to update my irregular series of graphs of movements in oil prices in currencies other than the USD. There's been a certain amount of movement in the oil and forex markets over the past few months, so I'm happy to oblige:

The CAD and the euro have appreciated by about 20% with respect to the USD and the yen since February. And inflation is below target in both Canada and the euro area. So it may not be a coincidence that Willem Buiter's recommendation to the ECB looks a lot like my recommendation to the Bank of Canada.